ChatGPT's translation:
"Russia regains the initiative and attacks in the northeast and east. Ukraine shifts to strategic defense, reorganizes, and must manage scarce resources. What is the situation, and what is needed?
In addition to the ongoing major Russian attacks near Avdiivka, Russia is now making several smaller attempts at advances. This has allowed Russia to regain the initiative on the front in the northeast and east. The territorial gains made so far remain small.
In the northeast, Russia is attacking towards Kupiansk. To the west of Kreminna, north and south of Sievierodonetsk, across a wide front west of Bakhmut, and southwest of Maryinka, Russian troops are also attempting to advance.
The focus of the Russian attacks appears to be westward from Bakhmut and near Avdiivka. North of Avdiivka, Russia has pushed its lines forward by several hundred meters, albeit with very high losses of material and personnel.
On the southern front, Russia is mainly carrying out airstrikes and drone attacks on Ukrainian positions, both near Robotyne and on the Ukrainian bridgehead on the left bank of the Dnipro northeast of Kherson.
In particular, Russian glide bombs, often retrofitted with simple wings and GLONASS navigation, are causing problems for Ukraine. These glide bombs are cheap for Russia, precise, and have more explosive power than artillery. Ukraine has no means to counter them so far.
Along with the attacks at the front, Russia is intensifying the shelling of cities near the front, such as Kherson, Nikopol, Bilohorivka, and others, with artillery, rocket artillery, and glide bombs, specifically to terrorize the civilian population.
Ukraine has switched to defense mode. However, at this stage, it seems that for the Ukrainian armed forces, it is no longer about holding positions at all costs, but rather about delay tactics.
Ukrainian units now have more freedom to decide situationally how to proceed with the aim of maximally wearing down Russian forces. This occasionally leads to Russian territorial gains but simultaneously results in extremely high losses on the Russian side.
Ukraine needs more artillery ammunition. This problem has been known for a long time. On some fronts, Ukraine can only conduct artillery battles to a very limited extent and must otherwise let itself be shelled in fortified positions.
Ukraine has too many outages of howitzers and armored vehicles because maintenance and repair are too far away, and spare parts and often also blueprints are missing.
Maintenance and repair for artillery, armored vehicles, and battle tanks need to be brought closer to the front quickly. Western manufacturers should also share their blueprints with Ukraine and enable Ukraine to produce its own spare parts.
Ukraine needs further air defense and drone defense, especially cheaper methods to counter masses of cheap Russian drones. This also includes the upgrading of existing battle tanks and armored personnel carriers with radars and drone defense systems.
Ukraine needs supply security for components for its rapidly growing drone production and help with the rapid expansion of ammunition and weapons production within Ukraine.
The situation is difficult for the Ukrainian armed forces, especially because resources such as artillery ammunition, spare parts, and rapid repair options are lacking. With better drone defense, more drones, and operationally deployable F-16s, the situation could improve.
It would help Ukraine greatly if the enforcement of sanctions against Russia is improved and the West better prevents the delivery of dual-use goods, machine tools, and armaments to Russia.
While Russia, also due to technological sanctions, for example, could only produce about 20-30 cruise missiles of the types Kalibr, X-22, and X-555 per month until recently, it has now increased production again to 100-120 monthly.
Unfortunately, it must be assumed that Russia has saved up produced cruise missiles and drones to overwhelm mainly Kyiv, but also other Ukrainian cities, with waves of attacks at Christmas, the turn of the year, and in the coldest months of January and February.
Ukraine needs more and constant supplies of precision weapons with long ranges. This includes Taurus, GLSDB, and ATACMS with monoblock warheads.
The Russian armed forces also have significant difficulties along the front line. The current attempts to advance are mainly leading to very high Russian losses and destroyed Ukrainian towns, but do not change the war strategically.
Talk of "hopelessness" or "defeat" of Ukraine is exaggerated in view of the real military situation.
The difficulties of Ukraine and especially the internal political blockade in the USA lead on the Russian side to premature victory rhetoric and overly confident propaganda.
Systematic extensive support of Ukraine, rapid improvement of industrial foundations, and targeted deployment of Western technologies to bring Ukraine into a position of superiority in the south continue to be the necessary approach.
The alternative to systematic, industrial, and more extensive support of Ukraine would be a protracted war of slow destruction of Ukraine starting from the east.
Ukraine's partners should finally move beyond the formula of 'support as long as necessary', frustrate Russian ambitions, and bring Ukraine into a stronger position to open a path to real solutions."