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Petr Štetiar ynezz

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@firelightning13
firelightning13 / [GUIDE] GPU Passthrough for Laptop with Fedora.md
Last active May 5, 2024 18:31
[GUIDE] GPU Passthrough for Laptop with Fedora

Abstract

This is a full guide for people who wanted to setup Windows 10/11 VM with QEMU/KVM hypervisor for laptops that configured with hybrid graphics card like Intel/AMD + NVIDIA. This process will take about 1 to 2 hours, depending on your system's performance.

There is another comprehensive guide you can follow here (shoutout to asus-linux team). It is more up-to-date than mine. I'll probably incorporate those information to my guide, but you are welcome to use this one as a reference!

Before we proceed:

  • This guide is exclusively for Fedora because this distro is quite different to set up than other distro such as Arch. I would say Arch is easier to setup than Fedora, but sometimes your prefer Fedora than Arch in terms of its usage & features.
  • This tutorial mostly focus on laptops with NVIDIA Optimus MUXed configuration when dGPU (dedicated GPU) can connect directly to HDMI/DP output. If in doubt, sea
@nstarke
nstarke / netgear-private-key-disclosure.md
Last active April 30, 2024 06:02
Netgear TLS Private Key Disclosure through Device Firmware Images

Netgear Signed TLS Cert Private Key Disclosure

Overview

There are at least two valid, signed TLS certificates that are bundled with publicly available Netgear device firmware.

These certificates are trusted by browsers on all platforms, but will surely be added to revocation lists shortly.

The firmware images that contained these certificates along with their private keys were publicly available for download through Netgear's support website, without authentication; thus anyone in the world could have retrieved these keys.

Trying to deploy WPA3 on my home network

Introduction

Recently, news broke about a new possible offline attack on WPA2 using PMKID. To summarize the attack, WPA2 protected APs can end up broadcasting PMKID values which can then be used to offline-brute-force the password.

These PMKID values are computed this way:

PMKID = HMAC-SHA1-128(PMK, "PMK Name" | MAC_AP | MAC_STA)