Thumbnail sketch: Two-factor (Yubikey or Google Authenticator) protected wallets
Computer. Shared-secret authenticator (Yubikey/Google Authenticator/etc). Server (possibly shared with millions of other users).
Motivating use case setup:
User creates a split (2-of-2 multisig) wallet on the computer and server. Keys must be securely backed up to protect against loss. GUI to be determined, but there will be some type of "Use Authenticator" checkbox specified at setup.
User also arranges for the server to know the shared secret with the shared-secret authenticator.
Motivating use case, usage:
Coins are sent into the wallet via P2SH 2-of-2 address(es).
On spend, user is prompted for authenticator one-time-password (OTP). One-time-password and half-signed transactions are sent to the server. If OTP is correct, second signature is created and payment is made immediately, with no further interaction required(*). If incorrect, no payment made (server should inform user of the invalid payment attempt via email/sms/carrier pigeon).
(*) server might offer to further validate high-value transactions via SMS or DNA sample submission or some other authentication method. And server might enforce rules to limit BTC sent per 24-hours or have other protections.
- Attacker steals computer / private keys, but does not have authenticator device and does not compromise server. Coins are safe.
- Attacker compromises my computer, installs malware (e.g. keylogger, or replaces client binary). Use of OTP authenticator limits loss of coins to whatever mitigation policy is in place on the server.
- Attacker compromises server. Coins are safe.
- Attacker compromises computer and server. Coins are lost, because both keys are compromised.
- Man-in-the-middle between computer and server. Coins are safe, attacker may DoS (prevent spending).