nabla-c0d3

#!/usr/bin/env python

import sys, socket, thread, ssl
from select import select

HOST = '0.0.0.0'
PORT = 5222
BUFSIZE = 4096

# Change this with the first two bytes of the SSL client hello

antirez

    dictForeach(d,entry)
        printf("%s -> %s\n", dictGetKey(entry), dictGetVal(entry));
        dictForeach(d2,entry2)
            printf("* %s\n", dictGetKey(entry2));
        dictEnd
    dictEnd

defuse

# This is well-known behavior, it's just interesting.
$ mkdir a
$ echo "hello!" > a/file.txt
$ cat a/file.txt
hello!
$ chmod 000 a/file.txt 
# Now I don't expect to be able to change a/file.txt...
$ echo "GOODBYE" > a/file.txt
bash: a/file.txt: Permission denied
# Okay, good, I can't modify the file directly.

takeshixx

#!/usr/bin/env python2
"""
Author: takeshix <takeshix@adversec.com>
PoC code for CVE-2014-0160. Original PoC by Jared Stafford (jspenguin@jspenguin.org).

Supportes all versions of TLS and has STARTTLS support for SMTP,POP3,IMAP,FTP and XMPP.
"""

import sys,struct,socket
from argparse import ArgumentParser

azet

So this happened: phrack changed it's format and posted a nice analysis of the 
(nowadays missing) hacker community and societal behaviour of hackers in 
general: http://phrack.org/papers/fall_of_groups.html
 
This article reflects a lot of thoughts I've had over the last couple of 
months. In a very positive way.
 
 
Yea sure, the scene we grew up in changed to what has now become a bullshit 
business like any other. Originality is scarce and every time I see SQLi or 

koenrh

RSA Conference 2014: cancellations

List of people who have cancelled either their session (e.g. talk, panel participation or seminar) at RSA Conference 2014.

Date	Name	Job title	More info
2014-01-20	Roel Schouwenberg	Senior Researcher, Kaspersky Lab	Tweet
2014-01-09	Jim Manico	Global Board Member, OWASP and VP of Security Architecture, WhiteHat Security	Tweet
2014-01-09	Eoin Keary	Global Board Member, OWASP and Director, BBC Risk Advisory	Tweet
2014-01-07	Chris Palmer	Software Security Engineer, Google	[Tweet](https://twitte

0xabad1dea

Sorry, RSA, I'm just not buying it

I want to be extremely clear about three things. First, this is my personal opinion – insert full standard disclaimer. Second, this is not a condemnation of everyone at RSA, present and past. I assume most of them are pretty okay, and that the problem is confined to a few specific points in the company. However, “unknown problem people making major decisions at RSA” is a bit unwieldy, so I will just say RSA. Third, I'm not calling for a total boycott on RSA. I work almost literally across the street from them and I don’t want to get beat up by roving gangs of cryptographers at the local Chipotle.

RSA's denial published last night is utter codswallop that denies pretty much everything in the world except the actual allegations put forth by Reuters and hinted at for months by [other sources](http://li

tarcieri

Semiprivate Keys

🚨 DANGER: INSECURE! 🚨

This may have seemed like a great idea in 2013, but the repeated "set/clear bits", a.k.a. clamping phases at each level of the hierarchy slowly subtract key strength.

Don't use this as described. Check out Ristretto.

Original text

Semi-private keys are an expansion of the traditional idea

azet

 for dir in `find . -maxdepth 1 -type d | tail -n +2`; do cd $dir ; echo "pulling $dir" ;  git pull || ( echo "failed in '$dir' - cd to original dir." && cd - 1>/dev/null ; exit 1 ) ; cd - 1>/dev/null ; done

abeluck

About

This is a local copy of the commands from:

• http://www.jmknoble.net/keys/#master-key
• http://www.macfreek.nl/mindmaster/Convert_GPG_keys_to_subkeys
• http://wiki.fsfe.org/Card_howtos/Card_with_subkeys_using_backups/

This guide serves as a reference of collected information necessary for strict management of PGP keys. This includes keeping a master key that always remains