niklasb

from sage.all import continued_fraction, Integer, inverse_mod

pubkey = (1696852658826990842058316561963467335977986730245296081842693913454799128341723605666024757923000936875008280288574503060506225324560725525210728761064310034604441130912702077320696660565727540525259413564999213382434231194132697630244074950529107794905761549606578049632101483460345878198682237227139704889943489709170676301481918176902970896183163611197618458670928730764124354693594769219086662173889094843054787693685403229558143793832013288487194871165461567L, 814161885590044357190593282132583612817366020133424034468187008267919006610450334193936389251944312061685926620628676079561886595567219325737685515818965422518820810326234612624290774570873983198113409686391355443155606621049101005048872030700143084978689888823664771959905075795440800042648923901406744546140059930315752131296763893979780940230041254506456283030727953969468933552050776243515721233426119581636614777596169466339421956338478341355508343072697451L, 17101222758731850777

niklasb

from sage.all import *
import base64

def factor(n,b):
    M=1
    print 'start'
    a = 2
    i=0
    for q in primes(b):
        i+=1

hellman

#-*- coding:utf-8 -*-

'''
In the challenge we are given a recently proposed cryptosystem
based on Mersenne primes ( https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/481 ).

The cryptosystem was broken quickly in https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/522.pdf
using random partitioning and LLL. Here this attack is implemented.

'''

hellman

/**
 * Print a Flag.
 * @author Daniel Bleichenbacher
 */
package blt;

import java.math.BigInteger;
import java.security.MessageDigest;
import java.security.SecureRandom;
import java.security.GeneralSecurityException;

hellman

#-*- coding:utf-8 -*-
'''
DEF CON 2017 Quals - Godzilla (Reverse)
Timing attack on RSA decryption.
Based on http://www.cs.jhu.edu/~fabian/courses/CS600.624/Timing-full.pdf

Another solutions:
https://gist.github.com/nneonneo/367240ae2d8e705bb9173a49a7c8b0cd by b2xiao
https://gist.github.com/Riatre/caac24840b176cf843b3f66ad9a5eeaf by riatre

hellman

'''
Common-prime (in group order!) RSA with low private exponent.
p = 2ga + 1
q = 2gb + 1
N = p * q
phi(N) = 2gab
'''

from sage.all import *